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Caveat
There is a belief that is held overwhelmingly by LGBT activists and
supporters of LGBT rights in North America: an institution called
“marriage” is, by dint of its name, better than an institution called “civil
union” (or “civil partnership” or “eingetragene lebenspartnerschaft” or
whatever). I do not subscribe to this belief. Nor do I subscribe to the belief
that respect and equality for gay and lesbian people, and same-sex couples,
is achieved by having only one institution for the regulation of domestic
relationships with one set of rules, to be applied identically to same-sex and
opposite-sex couples. Though this project does envisage examining civil
union regimes, the focus seems clearly to be on marriage, as shown by the
very title of the project. A more neutral title, one that would have a broader
world-view, would be “Formalised Same-Sex Relationships.” Otherwise
assumptions are made throughout that marriage is more worthy of study
than civil union and, worse, that it is the ultimate aim and that therefore, the
achievement of, for example, the United Kingdom in creating “civil
partnership” is a lesser achievement than that of, say, Canada or Sweden or
Iowa in opening “marriage” to same-sex couples. These assumptions
should not go unquestioned: they might well be the conclusion to be drawn
on the completion of the project but are not, in my view, an appropriate
starting point. Likewise, I should have preferred the first “Major Aim” to
have been expressed more neutrally: “To gather statistics about each
country’s regulations on formalised same-sex relationships.” There are, at
this moment in time, many more countries with civil union regimes than
with marriage regimes (for same-sex couples), and a comprehensive
examination of the position across the world needs to be neutral as to
whether one type of regime is better or worse than another (or, indeed,
whether such ranking is appropriate).
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1. Legal Framework
The United Kingdom has no formal written constitution (called as such),
though various instances of written law have constitutional import. The
United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy, whose legal system is
based on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. There is no higher law
than an Act of Parliament. But there are a number of constraints on this in
practice. The major legal constraints on the UK Parliament (both imposed,
be it noted, by Act of that very Parliament) are (i) the European
Communities Act 1973, which accepts the supremacy of European Union
law, and (ii) the Human Rights Act 1998. The 1998 Act obliges courts to
interpret Acts of Parliament, whenever possible, in a way that is consistent
with the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”); it obliges
public authorities to act consistently with the ECHR; it allows the courts to
grant declarations that Acts of Parliament are incompatible with the ECHR;
and it empowers Parliament to adopt an accelerated legislative process to
amend any Act declared by the courts to be incompatible.
The devolved legislatures within the United Kingdom (that is to say the
Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Irish Assembly)
are not sovereign parliaments. England has no devolved national
legislature and is directly governed by the UK Parliament which retains full
sovereignty over that constituent part of the United Kingdom. The
devolved legislatures are constrained by the UK legislation that established
them (the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998, and the
Northern Ireland Act 1998), and, as public authorities, are further
constrained by the Human Rights Act 1998 never to act in a way that is
incompatible with the ECHR. This means that the devolved legislatures
may not pass legislation or make regulations that are not ECHR-compliant.
Courts may strike down any legislation from these legislatures that they
find to be non-compliant, as being ultra vires the powers of the Parliament
or Assembly that passed it. Further, section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act
1998, specifically requires public authorities to have due regard to the need
to promote equality of opportunity between persons of different sexual
orientation (amongst other things). An equivalent provision for England
and Wales, and for Scotland, is now contained in section 149 of the
Equality Act 2010; but, not being contained in constituent legislation as it
is in Northern Ireland, this provision could be repealed by normal
legislative process.
2. Constitutional Regulations Applicable to Same-Sex Partnerships
The human rights guarantees contained in the European Convention on
Human Rights (“the Convention”) (insofar as they can be described as
“constitutional regulations”) are directly enforceable in the United
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Kingdom in the manner described above. These guarantees provide
support for the legal systems within the UK (and particularly those with
devolved legislatures) developing rules that avoid discrimination between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples. The articles of the Convention most
relevant here are articles 8, 12, and 14. Article 8 guarantees the right to
respect for private and family life; article 12 guarantees the right to marry
and found a family; and, article 14 provides that “The enjoyment of the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.” Since 1999 it has been
accepted that article 14 includes sexual orientation as one of the prohibited
grounds of discrimination (see part 12). The reference in article 8 to
“private life” has been used, in conjunction with article 12, to ensure that
personal relationships are regulated without distinction based on sexual
orientation; so far, however, the European Court has hesitated to base any
of its sexual orientation decisions on the reference in article 8 to “family
life,” focusing instead on “private life.” Only in X, Y and Z v. United
Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 143 is it implicit that a relationship between two
persons of the same gender, jointly bringing up their children, engages
“family life” for the purposes of article 8 (though this is obscured by the
fact that the couple was presented to the world as an opposite-sex couple,
one of the parties being transgender). In Schalk and Kopf v. Austria
(application No 30141/04) and Chapin and Charpentier v. France
(application no 40183/07), the European Court has been directly asked to
include same-sex couples within “family life” for the purposes of article 8
and its decision in these cases is awaited.
Article 12 protects the right to marry and found a family. This has not
yet been defined in a way that is inclusive of same-sex couples marrying,
and indeed, the European Court’s jurisprudence is presently hostile to
same-sex marriage. The article is perhaps the least rigorously analysed in
the whole of the Convention, and insofar as the European Court of Human
Rights has attempted to give guidance as to its meaning, the assumption has
been made that “the right to marry and found a family” refers to
“traditional marriage,” that is to say marriage involving an opposite-sex
couple. This has been affirmed, rather than challenged, in a series of cases
involving transgender persons who have sought (ultimately successfully) to
be recognised in their new gender for the purposes of contracting, what
would then, be an opposite-sex marriage. As stated in Rees v. United
Kingdom (1986) 9 EHRR 56 para. 49:
In the Court’s opinion, the right to marry guaranteed by Article 12, refers
to the traditional marriage between persons of opposite biological sex.
This appears also from the wording of the Article which makes it clear
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that Article 12 is mainly concerned to protect marriage as the basis of the
family.

Though the reference to “biological sex” can no longer stand in light of
the Court’s subsequent decision in Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002) 35
EHRR 447, it remains unlikely that the Court will extend its understanding
of article 12 beyond “traditional marriage between persons of the opposite
sex”. In Parry v. United Kingdom (application 42971/05, 28 November
2006), the European Court, declaring inadmissible an application by a
couple whose marriage had to be converted into a civil partnership,
contrary to their wishes, due to the change of sex of one of the spouses,
said this:
Article 12 . . . enshrines the traditional concept of marriage as between a
man and a woman . . . . While it is true that there are a number of
Contracting States which have extended marriage to same-sex partners,
this reflects their own vision of the role of marriage in their societies and
does not flow from an interpretation of the fundamental right [contained
in article 12].

The European Court is currently considering two claims by same-sex
couples that the failure of domestic law to allow them to marry is a breach
of articles 8, 12, and 14 (Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (hearing on
25/02/2010); Chapin and Charpetier v. France). The Court would have to
reverse its existing jurisprudence before allowing the claim on the basis of
article 12. Nevertheless, the extension of article 14 to sexual orientation
will make it difficult to deny that article 12 encompasses same-sex couples
in those European countries, like Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, where marriage is open to such couples, with
the result that opposite-sex and same-sex married couples will be required
to be treated the same. Likewise, the interplay between articles 8, 12, and
14 suggests strongly that countries (like the United Kingdom) which have a
civil union regime for same-sex couples will have difficulty justifying
substantial differences in legal treatment between that institution and
opposite-sex marriage. But it may well be that minor differences—such as
those that exist in the UK (see part 5)—could be justified by the aim of
protecting religious sensitivities, as manifested by the traditional
parameters of marriage. That institution has no special constitutional
protection in the UK (as it does in, for example, Ireland, Germany, and
Hungary); but, the political decision to treat marriage as a socially special
institution is likely to be considered by the European Court to be a
legitimate governmental aim within a state’s margin of appreciation.
Beyond that, it is unlikely that the European Court will hold that article 12
requires other countries to open their marriage regimes to same-sex
couples. Much more likely is that the Court in Schalk and Chapin will hold
countries in breach of articles 8 and 14 if they provide to same-sex couples
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no means of accessing the rights and obligations that are open to oppositesex couples via marriage. In other words, the approach in Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) is likely to be followed by the European Court in
preference to the reasoning in Goodridge v. Dept. Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941 (Mass. 2003); Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d 605 (2004).
3. Legal Statutes on Same-Sex Marriage
Marriage in all the legal systems in the United Kingdom is explicitly
limited by Act of Parliament to opposite-sex couples: Matrimonial Causes
Act 1973, § 11(c) (England and Wales); Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, §
5(1)(d)); Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 (SI 2003 No 413 (NI 3)),
art. 6(6)(e)). Indeed, foreign marriages involving same-sex couples will be
treated in the United Kingdom as if they were civil partnerships rather than
as marriages: Civil Partnership Act 2004, § 212(1) and Schedule 20. It has
been held at High Court level that this rule does not infringe articles 8, 12,
and 14 (Wilkinson v. Kitzinger, discussed at part 12).
4. Differences Between Same-Sex Marriage and Opposite-Sex
Marriage
Not applicable.
5. Civil Union Regulation (Especially Entry into and Exit from Union)
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force in December 2005 and
creates a statutory institution for the legal recognition and regulation of
same-sex relationships, which is distinct from, but equivalent to, the
existing institution of marriage, a common law institution that has for many
centuries recognised and regulated opposite-sex relationships. Though it is
an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament, the Civil Partnership Act 2004
creates, in three separate parts, three distinct civil partnership regimes, each
of which is designed to replicate the marriage regimes in the three separate
legal systems that make up the United Kingdom. Civil partnership regimes
are created in part II of the Act for England and Wales, in part III for
Scotland, and in part IV for Northern Ireland. These regimes differ from
each other insofar as the existing marriage regimes in these different
jurisdictions differ from each other.
The conditions for entering a civil partnership within each of the three
constituent legal systems of the United Kingdom replicate the conditions
for entering a marriage, other than the gender mix. Termination of a civil
partnership before death is by judicial dissolution, following the same
process as divorce (for the termination of marriage) and granted on the
same grounds —other than that adultery is not a ground for dissolving a
civil partnership.
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The conditions for entering a civil partnership are that the parties:
i. Are both of the same sex
ii. Are neither married nor in a civil partnership already
iii. Are both over the age of 16
iv. Are not within the forbidden degrees of relationship with each other
v. Are capable of understanding the nature of civil partnership
vi. Are capable of validly consenting to the creation of a civil
partnership
The law in England and Wales requires the satisfaction of conditions (i)
– (iv) (2004 Act, § 3 and sched. 1); the law in Northern Ireland requires the
satisfaction of conditions (i) – (v) (2004 Act, § 138 and sched. 12); the law
in Scotland requires the satisfaction of conditions (i) – (vi) (2004 Act, § 86
and sched. 10). Parental or guardianship consent is required if one or both
parties is under the age of 18 in England and Wales (2004 Act, § 4) or in
Northern Ireland (2004 Act, § 145). Parental consent to marry or enter into
a civil partnership is not required in Scotland.
5A: Differences Between Civil Union and Marriage
[There should at this point be a question in relation to civil union,
equivalent to Question 4 for marriage: is there any formal difference (other
than gender mix) between marriage and civil union? The answer to such a
question for the United Kingdom would be as follows:]
None of the three civil partnership regimes created by the United
Kingdom’s Civil Partnership Act 2004 is in all respects identical to the
three marriage regimes upon which they were based. The differences are
primarily sexual and religious. Marriage remains to some extent both a
sexual relationship and a religious institution. Civil partnership, on the
other hand, is wholly “desexed” and (originally) completely secularised.
Civil partnership as a “desexed” relationship
Though it is true that civil partnership is assumed to involve parties who
are (or at least were) in a sexual relationship with each other (so for
example two sisters who live together in a mutually supportive and lifelong relationship are ineligible to register for a civil partnership, Burden v.
United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 38) there is no legal requirement that the
relationship is or was sexual, and no legal consequence for the relationship
to any sexual act, or absence thereof. This distinguishes civil partnership
from marriage since the marriage rules concerning sexual behaviour are not
replicated for civil partnership. Adultery, which remains a ground for
divorce in all three jurisdictions (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, § 1(2)(a)
(England and Wales); Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, § 1(2)(a); Matrimonial
Causes (Northern Ireland) Order 1978, § 3(2)(a)), is not a ground for the
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dissolution of a civil partnership (all the other grounds of divorce are
equally grounds for dissolving a civil partnership). Sexual potency remains
relevant to marriage. Inability or refusal to consummate a marriage is a
ground upon which it might be nullified in England and Wales
(Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 § 12(a) and (b)) and in Northern Ireland
(Matrimonial Causes (Northern Ireland) Order 1978, § 14(a) and (b)), the
marriage remaining valid but voidable until it is nullified. But these rules
are not replicated in the Civil Partnership Act. In Scotland incurable
impotency is, at common law, the only ground upon which a marriage is
voidable but that ground is not extended by legislation to civil partnership.
Civil partnership as a secular institution
Civil partnership was deliberately designed to be a completely secular
(non-religious) institution (see Hansard, HL 22 April 2004, col. 388;
Hansard, HC 12 October 2004, col. 177). Marriage, to different extents in
each of the three UK legal systems, is both secular and religious. In
particular, marriages in the United Kingdom can be solemnised by either a
church officer or a secular state official (a registrar). Civil partnership may
be registered only by a registrar—and indeed the language of
“solemnization,” with its sacramental overtones, is avoided completely.
Place of registration was originally deliberately secular in all parts of the
United Kingdom (Civil Partnership Act 2004, §§ 6, 93) and registrations
were prohibited at any “religious premises,” which are defined to mean
premises used solely or mainly for religious purposes or which have in the
past been so used and have not subsequently been used solely or mainly for
other purposes. The rule has now changed for England and Wales and,
under section 202 of the Equality Act 2010 (not yet in force), regulations
(not yet made) may provide for the approval of religious premises for the
registration of civil partnership; even here, however, registration is at the
hands of the secular registrar and not the religious official in whose
premises the registration takes place.
6. Opposite-sex Civil Unions
Civil partnership in all three constituent parts of the United Kingdom is
limited to same-sex couples: Civil Partnership Act 2004, §§ 3 (England and
Wales), 86 (Scotland), and 138 (Northern Ireland).
7. Differential treatment for opposite-sex civil unions
Not applicable.
8. Specific Purpose Recognition
Not applicable.
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9. Future Developments with Marriage
The United Kingdom Government, which became Conservativedominated in May 2010, is unlikely to change the position in relation to
marriage and civil partnership, with the former being limited to oppositesex couples and the latter to same-sex couples. The major LGBT
campaigning groups in the United Kingdom have not in the past seen either
the opening of marriage to same-sex couples or the opening of civil
partnership to opposite-sex couples as major campaign priorities, but they
do tend to support calls for such openings. In March 2009, the Scottish
Parliament accepted a Public Petition (PE 1239) urging the Scottish
Government to open marriage and civil partnership to both types of
couples. Some of the minority parties, represented in the Scottish
Parliament, but none of the major parties, support this call, and the Scottish
Government is presently resisting the pressure.
10. Future Regulation of Civil Union
Not applicable.
11. Non-Legislative Regulations
Not applicable.
12. Judicial Construction of the Law
The European Convention on Human Rights continues to be a major
influence in discrimination law in the United Kingdom. The UK was
forced to change the criminal law in Northern Ireland in relation to malemale sexual activity by the European Court of Human Right’s decision in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (1981) 3 EHRR 40 (decriminalisation had
occurred earlier in England and Wales (1967) and in Scotland (1980)). In
Dudgeon, the Court held that a complete ban on same-sex sexual activity
was a breach of the right to private life as protected by article 8 of the
ECHR, though it did not address the issue of discrimination under article
14. It was not until 1999 that sexual-orientation discrimination was held to
be within the terms of article 14 (Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal
(2001) 31 EHRR 47).
Following that decision, differential age
requirements to sexual activity based on the gender mix of the participants
was held to be contrary both to article 8 and article 14 (SL v. Austria (2003)
37 EHRR 30), and differential treatment regarding other civil rights for
same-sex couples as opposed to opposite-sex couples was held contrary to
article 8 in Karner v. Austria (2003) 2 FLR 623. Though the European
Court has not yet directly held that same-sex couples are entitled to the
protection of family life guaranteed by article 8, the Court now very clearly
takes the view that, just like legal differences based on sex, legal
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differences based on sexual orientation may be justified only by
particularly serious and persuasive reasons (SL v. Austria at para. 37,
Karner v. Austria at para. 37, and Burden v. United Kingdom at para. 47).
Within the context of the European Union too, discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation has been prohibited in the fields of employment
(Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 (SI
2003/1661), giving effect to Council Directive 2000/78/EC) and the
provision of goods and services (Equality Act (Sexual Orientation)
Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/1263), also giving effect to Council Directive
2000/78/EC). These provisions have now all been consolidated into the
Equality Act 2010.
Domestic case law is also supportive of equality between same-sex and
opposite-sex couples. The breakthrough case was that of Fitzpatrick v.
Sterling Housing Association (1999) 4 All ER 705, in which the House of
Lords held that a same-sex couple could be a “family” for the purposes of
legislation governing the succession to tenancies (reaching the same
decision as the Supreme Court of New York had done ten years previously
in Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989)). The Court
held at the same time, however, that a same-sex couple could not be said to
be “living together as husband and wife.” But once the Human Rights Act
1998 came into force that latter holding was reversed in Ghaidan v.
Mendoza (2004) 3 All ER 411, where the House of Lords held that the
Human Rights Act 1998 required UK courts to depart from the
unambiguous meaning of legislation, and even from the intention of
Parliament, if this was necessary to achieve consistency with the ECHR.
The phrase “living together as husband and wife” had now to be read to
mean “living together as if they were husband and wife” in order to include
same-sex cohabiting couples within the terms of the legislation, for nondiscrimination between these two types of couple was required, the House
of Lords accepted, by articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR.
The UK’s rule that all formalised (i.e. registered) relationships from
overseas involving same-sex couples, even those structured as, and named,
marriage in the country of their creation, will be treated as civil partnership
was challenged in Wilkinson v. Kitzinger (2006) EWHC 2022, (2007) 1
FLR 296 as a breach of articles 8, 12, and 14. The challenge failed. The
judge accepted that there was different treatment based on sexual
orientation, but held that this was justified. He said (at para. 122):
With a view (1) to according formal recognition to relationships between
same sex couples which have all the features and characteristics of
marriage save for the ability to procreate children, and (2) preserving and
supporting the concept and institution of marriage as a union between
persons of opposite sex or gender, Parliament has taken steps by enacting
the Civil Partnership Act to accord to same-sex relationships effectively
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all the rights, responsibilities, benefits and advantages of civil marriage
save the name, and thereby to remove the legal, social and economic
disadvantages suffered by homosexuals who wish to join stable longterm relationships. To the extent that by reason of that distinction it
discriminates against same-sex partners, such discrimination has a
legitimate aim, is reasonable and proportionate, and falls within the
margin of appreciation accorded to Convention States.

Another case of relevance here is Ladele v. London Borough Council of
Islington (2009) EWCA Civ 1357, (2010) 1 WLR 955. A marriage
registrar was disciplined and threatened with dismissal when she refused to
participate in the registration of civil partnerships on the grounds that to do
so would conflict with her “orthodox Christian” beliefs in the sanctity of
marriage.
She claimed that this amounted to direct and indirect
discrimination contrary to the Employment and Equality (Religion or
Belief) Regulations 2003, as read with article 9 of the ECHR (the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion). The Court of Appeal for
England and Wales held that there was no direct discrimination against
Ladele because the Council’s actions were a response to her refusal to carry
out civil partnership duties and not a response to her religious beliefs.
There was no indirect discrimination because the Council’s legitimate aim
was not only to ensure that all couples who wished to register a civil
partnership had access to a registrar who would do so, but also, to ensure
that the Council acted consistently with its stated policy of fighting
discrimination against gay and lesbian citizens and employees. The Court
endorsed the finding of the Employment Appeal Tribunal that “once it is
accepted that the aim of providing the service on a non-discriminatory basis
was legitimate—and in truth it was bound to do so—then . . . it must follow
that [the Council] were entitled to require all registrars to perform the full
range of services” (per Lord Neuberger MR at para. 49). Importantly, the
Court held that the council’s policy of requiring all its registrars to perform
civil partnership duties was a proportionate means of achieving its aim of
providing a non-discriminatory public service, notwithstanding that some
other councils might not impose this requirement on its registrars. Indeed,
the Court was willing to contemplate that councils could not lawfully
exempt their registrars from civil partnership duties, on the ground that the
Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 (now the Equality Act
2010), which prohibits discrimination in the provision of goods and
services on the basis of sexual orientation, takes precedence over any rights
which a person might otherwise have by virtue of his or her religious belief
or faith, to practice discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation
(paras. 71 and 74).
13. Other Relevant Issues
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(i) Recognition of Overseas Relationships
The United Kingdom’s Civil Partnership Act 2004 makes explicit (and
complex) provision for the recognition within the UK of same-sex
relationships that have been formalised abroad. The rules are contained in
Part V, Chapter 2 of the 2004 Act. The Act defines those “overseas
relationships” that are eligible for recognition, and then sets out the
recognition rule.
To be eligible for recognition under the Act the relationship must either
be of a type that is specified in schedule 20 to the Act or be of a type that
meets certain “general conditions.” Schedule 20 specifies relationships
from a number of jurisdictions including California, Maine, Massachusetts,
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, France,
Spain, and Canada, and this list has subsequently been added to by the
Civil Partnership Act 2004 (Overseas Relationships) Order 2005 (SI 2005
No 3135) so that it also includes Andorra, Luxembourg, New Zealand,
Connecticut, and New Jersey. The “general conditions” are that the type of
relationship (i) may not be entered into if either party is already married or
in a relationship of that kind, (ii) is of indeterminate duration and (iii) has
the effect of treating the parties as a couple either generally or for specified
purposes (2004 Act, § 212(1)(a) – 214). Any individual relationship that is
either of a type listed in schedule 20 or of a type that meets the general
conditions will be eligible for recognition if (i) it has been registered with a
responsible authority, (ii) it is between two persons of the same sex, and
(iii) it is between two persons neither of whom is presently married or in a
civil partnership (§ 212(1)(b)). Being limited to same-sex couples,
opposite-sex civil unions from, say, South Africa, the Netherlands, or New
Zealand are not eligible to be recognised as civil partnerships under the
2004 Act. However, foreign marriages involving same-sex couples (many
of which are explicitly listed in schedule 20) are eligible for recognition,
but as civil partnerships. So marriages involving same-sex couples from,
say, Canada, Sweden, or Iowa will be treated in the United Kingdom as
civil partnerships even if they are treated as marriage in the country of their
creation. Additionally, domestic partnerships (see subsection iii) such as
the French Pacs and the Victorian registered domestic relationship, will be
treated as civil partnership in the UK when they involve same-sex couples;
the crucial defining characteristic is registration of a same-sex relationship
and not its legal consequences.
The recognition rule itself, once it is established that the individual
relationship is eligible for recognition, is that under the relevant law both
parties had capacity to enter into the relationship and they met all that law’s
requirements necessary to ensure the formal validity of the relationship.
The “relevant law” is the law of the country or territory where the
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relationship is registered, including its rules of private international law
(2004 Act, § 212(2)). In other words, the lex loci registrationis governs
both formalities and capacity. A registered same-sex union (whatever its
technical form) valid by the lex loci registrationis will be treated as a civil
partnership in the United Kingdom. This is a noticeably generous and
inclusive approach and relationships from most foreign countries with
formalised same-sex relationship regimes will be eligible for recognition in
the UK.
(ii) Informal Relationships (cohabitants/de facto relationships)
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 does not provide a comprehensive set of
rules for the recognition or regulation of informal relationships, that is to
say relationships that are not registered with an appropriate authority
(usually referred to in the United Kingdom as “cohabiting couples,” or
cohabitants —in many other countries, such as Australia and New Zealand,
they are referred to as “de facto couples” and de facto partners). But the
House of Lords has made plain that, wherever possible, statutes referring to
cohabiting couples should be read to include same-sex cohabiting couples
because the ECHR requires that opposite-sex and same-sex couples be
treated the same (Ghaidan v. Mendoza, part 12 above). Where this is not
possible on the words of the statute (for example because they are
explicitly gender-specific) it is likely that a declaration of incompatibility
will be made by the court.
Scottish law has gone rather further than the law in England and Wales,
and Northern Ireland, in granting rights and responsibilities to cohabiting
couples, and whenever it has done so since 1999 (when the Scottish
Parliament was re-established) it has included within its terms same-sex
couples. Additionally, the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 contains
various provisions extending to same-sex cohabitants those rights and
responsibilities already existing for opposite-sex couples. So Scottish law
can now claim to make no distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex
couples who live together in unregistered relationships. The major rights
are family home protection (Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection)
(Scotland) Act 1981, as amended to include civil partners in the Civil
Partnership Act 2004 and as amended to include same-sex cohabitants in
the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006); the right to claim financial
readjustment on separation (Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, § 28); and
the right to claim a portion of a deceased cohabitant’s intestate estate on
death (Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, § 29). In each of these cases the
claim available to a cohabitant is of lesser worth than the claim available to
a married or civilly empartnered person.
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(iii) Domestic Partnership Schemes
The full picture of same-sex relationship recognition cannot emerge
clearly without drawing a distinction between marriage and civil union
schemes on the one hand and what are usually called “domestic
partnership” schemes on the other hand. Domestic partnerships differ from
informal relationships in that they involve the registration of the
relationship, but they also crucially differ from marriage and civil union
schemes in that no divorce or analogous process is needed to bring the
relationship to an end, and the registration of the relationship does not
create a status that has effect on the capacity of the individual party to the
relationship to contract another relationship. In other words, parties to a
domestic partnership scheme, such as is available in Hawaii, Maine, and
Washington (USA); Victoria (Australia); France; and, Uruguay, remain
free to marry or enter a civil union even before their existing domestic
partnership has been ended (and usually doing so is one of the means of
bringing the domestic partnership to an end). In the United Kingdom,
foreign domestic partnership schemes will be treated as civil partnerships,
so long as the relationship has been registered and it otherwise satisfies the
recognition rules specified above. The anomaly that the relationship is
converted thereby into one that cannot now be escaped from by means
other than judicial process is more apparent than real and is no different
from a marriage created in a legal system that permits easy and non-judicial
escape (for example by talaq) but which, if the parties subsequently acquire
a domicile in the United Kingdom, can only be terminated by a court of
law.
(iv)The Parent-Child Relationship
(a) Adoption:
In each of the jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, same-sex couples,
whether registered as civil partners with each other or not, are permitted to
adopt children jointly: Adoption and Children Act 2002, §§ 50 and 144(4),
for England and Wales; Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, § 29,
for Scotland. These provisions permit “couples” to adopt jointly, and
“couple” is defined to mean partners who are either married to each other,
civil partners of each other, or living with each other in an enduring family
relationship. In Northern Ireland article 14 of the Adoption (Northern
Ireland) Order 1987 restricted joint adoption to married couples but in Re P
(A Child) (Adoption: Unmarried Couple) (2008) UKHL 38, (2009) 1 AC
173, the House of Lords held that an unmarried (opposite-sex) couple could
adopt since the limitation was contrary to articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR.
There is no indication that this decision is limited to opposite-sex couples
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and so it may be said with some confidence that in all parts of the United
Kingdom, stable couples, whatever their gender mix and whether or not
their relationship is registered with the state through marriage or civil
partnership, are entitled to apply for an adoption order over a child.
(b) Artificial Reproduction:
Applying in all the jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 provides that where a woman has
become pregnant as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm
and eggs or of her artificial insemination, and at that time she was a party
to either a marriage or a civil partnership, her husband will be treated as the
father or her (female) civil partner will be treated as a parent of the child
unless it can be shown that the husband or the civil partner, as the case may
be, did not consent to the placing in the woman of the embryo or the sperm
and eggs or to her artificial insemination (2008 Act, §§ 35 and 42). If the
woman who becomes pregnant by these artificial means is unmarried and
not in a civil partnership but nevertheless has a partner (male or female),
then the partner becomes the father or a parent, as the case may be, so long
as that partner consents to being treated as the father or a parent (2008 Act,
§§ 36 and 43).
(c) Surrogacy:
If a child is born as a result of his or her gestational mother having
entered into a surrogacy arrangement, the commissioning couple can obtain
a “parenting order” (which has the same effect as an adoption order) so
long as one or both of the couple is genetically a parent of the child, and the
couple is either married to each other, civil partners of each other, or living
as partners in an enduring family relationship (2008 Act, § 54). This
applies throughout the United Kingdom and is available whatever the
gender mix of the couple and whether or not the relationship is registered.
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